

104

# SITUATION IN BOSNIA

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Y 4. IN 8/16: B 65

Situation in Bosnia, 104-1 Hearing...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 8, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



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## SITUATION IN BOSNIA

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THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1995

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 4:30 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The meeting will come to order. This hearing has been convened at the end of 2 very hectic weeks in which we have seen the crisis in Bosnia weaken and our policy vacillate almost on a daily basis and with virtually no actual consultation between our membership and the administration.

That is why we welcome the hearing. Please accept my apologies for the delay and for the continual adjournments of the opening hour. We, as you know, have been on the floor on a major measure out of this committee and we are pleased that that resulted in a favorable result.

This morning we received the great news that Capt. Scott O'Grady, the pilot of the F-16 shot down over Bosnia last Friday, had been rescued in good health and we want to commend our military leaders for the outstanding job they did in arranging that rescue and the courageous men that were involved in that rescue operation.

We have been in the air base outside—north of Venice where all of these fliers had been stationed and we had an opportunity to talk with the leadership out there to at Aviano and to be able to examine close hand what their work entailed. We came to recognize how difficult some of those problems have been and for that reason, we want to commend our military leaders for the kind of work they are doing out there.

However, that news along with the release of some of the U.N. troops being held hostage seem to be the only good things that give us any comfort in a situation that otherwise seems very bleak indeed and we know how complex the problem in Bosnia is and there doesn't seem to be any good answers about Bosnia.

While I welcome our distinguished panel of high administration officials, Mr. Tarnoff of the Department of State, Mr. Slocombe, General Clark from the Defense Department, I must say that rarely have I seen the foreign policy of our Government appear to be in a greater state of disarray and we hope we are going to be able to get some semblance of order out of that.

While we all recognize the crisis in Bosnia is a problem, as one of the gentleman said, a problem from hell, the Secretary of State

reminded us it is difficult to understand or much less excuse the absence of any concern on the part of the administration the views of the Congress on this important issue. It is for that reason we welcome you being here with us today to share your thoughts.

While I don't want to make any lengthy statement to detract from the time some of our members will have for the number of questions I know they have, I just for the record would like to remind our panelists that consultation doesn't mean just a telephone call to a member or to the committee to tell us about the policy that we have already read about in the morning papers or seen on CNN.

I would think meaningful consultation should require a discussion with give and take and possible options before anyone has settled upon and leaked it to the *New York Times*. I believe the previous administrations have done their best to allow for this kind of consultation and I would urge that in the future the administration do as well.

That would help to minimize embarrassment for our own Nation in the eyes of our friends and enemies around the world, as well as to garner the critically necessary support of the Congress and the American people for our foreign policy to address complex problems like Bosnia. So without further ado, unless my colleagues have some opening remarks and I ask my colleagues if they do—

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Welcome our distinguished witnesses. I think the events on the floor today certainly underscored the sense that people are frustrated and tired of a situation that continues to fester.

I know good efforts are being made. General Clark and I, and Mr. Hoyer, had met earlier in the week, and I certainly have a great deal of respect for him personally and for the work that he is doing.

But the Bosnians are being slaughtered. Dr. Siladzic testified earlier before the Helsinki Commission, which I chair. In talking about the new mission that is contemplated by the British and the French, he said this is worse than the status quo, that they don't want Americans, they don't want British, they don't want French troops, ground troops fighting their battle. They want to fight their own battle.

And you know, part of the difficulty is how do we get from here to there. But it seems that the status quo may be in perpetuity unless something is done at least in the near term. I also think, and I say this very emphatically, that the fact that it was offered by the distinguished gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Hoyer, underscores that this is bipartisan.

I mean there is no effort to try to get partisan advantage with this. He and I were both critics of the Bush administration because we thought their policy was wrongheaded, as well. Now it just happens that his party is in power and he continues to be faithful to his position, so I certainly respect him for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Do any of our other members wish to make any opening statement, Mr. Bereuter?

Mr. BEREUTER. No, thank you.



Chairman GILMAN. Please proceed, Mr. Tarnoff.

**STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TARNOFF, UNDER SECRETARY  
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS**

Mr. TARNOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the administration's views and policies in Bosnia. We are certainly acutely conscious of the interest in the Congress and the country on this issue, and we hope that this hearing will allow us to continue a policy of consultation and exchange of views with the Congress on this issue.

Today my colleagues and I will address three main issues: our strategy for dealing with the conflicts in the Balkans, which remains unchanged, how we view recent developments and our continuing support for UNPROFOR and why that is consistent in our view with U.S. interests. I will address our overall goals and diplomatic strategy. Under Secretary Slocombe will then discuss the meetings last week in Paris among ministers and military chiefs of defense from NATO and the EU countries and how the steps they endorse will strengthen UNPROFOR.

Under Secretary Slocombe will also outline current and possible future U.S. military operations in the region. Then General Clark will address a number of operational military questions related to our support for UNPROFOR under various circumstances.

With respect to U.S. interests in the Balkans, our principal goals in the region remain to contain and help bring an end to the ongoing conflicts which threaten our interests in European stability and integration. From the outset of these conflicts, we have sought to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multiethnic state, support the peaceful restoration of Croatian sovereignty throughout that country, assist the peacekeeping and other activities of our NATO allies in the U.N., and do our best to relieve the considerable human suffering.

To achieve these ends, we have led efforts to bring about negotiated settlements. We have led NATO military responses to calls by the U.N. for assistance in protection of its forces in safe areas for the people of Bosnia. We have deployed peacekeeping troops in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history.

In addition, we have contributed generously to humanitarian assistance efforts in Bosnia. Despite many disappointments and frustrations, and we all share them dramatically, the international community's efforts have, in our view, yielded some benefits.

UNPROFOR's presence has diminished the level of killing. NATO's operation deny flight, which enforces the no-fly zone, has ended aerial bombardment of cities. UNPROFOR provides transport, drivers and logistic support to the UNHCR and delivery of essential relief to 2.2 million people throughout the former Yugoslavia, including 787,000 refugees and displaced persons.

The war between the Croats and the Muslims was brought to an end in March of last year with the formation of the Federation, which has sharply reduced the need for humanitarian relief. UNPROFOR has also performed well in monitoring the peaceful

implementation of the Washington accord between Muslims and Croats.

The monitors that we and other members of the ICFY have deployed on the border between Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro have reduced the Bosnian Serb Army's ability to wage war over the past year. Without these U.N. and national programs, in our view, the situation would have been much worse than it is now in Bosnia.

On the question of the search for a political settlement, our diplomatic goal in Bosnia remains to end the war consistent with the internationally agreed contact group effort. Several weeks ago, the contact group decided to explore an initiative backed by Bosnian President Izetbegovic that would tie Miloslevic's recognition of Bosnia and acceptance of even tighter control over his country's borders with Bosnia and Croatia to sanction suspension for Serbia.

Last month contact group ministers met in the Hague to review this initiative and they agreed that U.S. Ambassador Robert Frasure should travel to Belgrade to discuss further Belgrade's recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bolstering of the monitoring regime along the Serbian-Bosnian border and the nature of sanctions suspension to be granted by the U.N. in response to these steps.

Although we have made some progress in these discussions with Miloslevic, he continues to demand a more unqualified formula for sanctions suspension than we can support. Ambassador Frasure left Belgrade yesterday to consult with contact group representatives and the Bosnian Government and he returned back to Washington today for consultations with all of us.

We have engaged in this dialog with Miloslevic because we think that he can play a useful role in bringing about a peace settlement in Bosnia. For the past several months, Belgrade has distanced itself from the policies of the Pale leadership both by closing its border with Serb-held Bosnia and most recently by Miloslevic's condemnation of the hostage taking by Pale and efforts to secure their release.

By recognizing Bosnia, Miloslevic would frustrate the dreams held by many in Pale of merging the territory under their control to greater Serbia. Our dealings with Miloslevic are intended to increase the chances that Pale would negotiate seriously with the Bosnian Government.

We do not expect Miloslevic to deliver the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table single-handedly. The Serbs in Pale have a large measure of political independence from Belgrade, so much so that Miloslevic views Karadzic more as a rival than as a partner.

However, Belgrade exercises substantial persuasive influence with Serbs in Bosnia as witnessed by Belgrade's partially successful efforts to win release of the U.N. hostages. Should Belgrade agree to the recognition package under discussion, the effect would be to bolster the contact group's efforts to bring the parties back into negotiations.

On the question of detained U.N. personnel, in recent days the administration worked closely with our contact group partners in the U.N. to secure both release of U.N. personnel held by the Bosnian Serbs and information on the F-16 pilot shot down last Friday, who was rescued early today. We have endeavored to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of all U.N. personnel.

As of yesterday, 229 of the detainees have been released by Bosnian Serb forces, but another 149 U.N. personnel are still being detained and/or blocked in their positions. Efforts to secure their release are ongoing.

On the issue of support to allies in UNPROFOR, we believe UNPROFOR's mission should continue if at all possible because of the substantial contributions it has made to assist the people of Bosnia. Withdrawal now would trigger an even worse humanitarian disaster, including greater allied casualties and the risk of a spillover of the conflict.

But in order to remain, UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. Under Secretary Slocombe and General Clark will elaborate on the measures to achieve this end endorsed by defense ministers and military chiefs of staff at their meeting in Paris last weekend.

We are convinced, Mr. Chairman, that these steps to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to protect itself offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions usefully. These efforts are not designed to set the stage for withdrawal of UNPROFOR.

On the contrary, our European allies have demonstrated their resolve to do more to make this mission work better and they are determined to ensure that humanitarian relief operations get through to those in need and to maintain the presence that will continue to mitigate the level of violence.

Only if such conditions prevail can efforts to find a peaceful solution continue. But as the President has noted, we have a long-standing commitment to help our allies by using our unique military capabilities to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw all or part of UNPROFOR safely from Bosnia should that become necessary.

Last week the President said we would assist NATO as requested in emergency operations to extract certain units serving with UNPROFOR to safe locations in Bosnia. We do not expect there to be much demand for any such support as my colleagues will explain.

To reiterate, should the President consider it necessary to commit U.S. forces for either emergency extraction or withdrawal, I can assure you that there would be close consultation with Members of Congress and that the President would seek the support of Congress as well as the American people.

On the question of lifting the embargo, we of course have noted the sentiment in this house and much of the country. But we have always felt the U.N. arms embargo unfairly penalized the Bosnia Government, which is the victim of Serb aggression.

In 1993 and 1994, we advocated multilateral action to end the embargo but lacked sufficient support in the U.N. Security Council. In compliance with the Nunn-Mitchell amendment, we have ended our participation in enforcement efforts against Bosnia but continue to honor the arms embargo.

However, we still firmly oppose unilateral lifting of the arms embargo, which we believe would lead to a wider war and bloodier conflict with a very uncertain outcome for which the United States would have ultimate responsibility. Such a conflict would cause major strains in NATO and the U.N. and risk a serious confronta-



tion with Russia, which along with Serbia might choose to provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.

Most importantly, Mr. Chairman, the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would undermine other U.N. resolutions and sanctions regimes such as for Iraq and Libya that serve critical U.S. interests.

Our efforts to stabilize the situation in Bosnia include several other initiatives. In Croatia, we are working with the parties in the U.N. to prevent escalation of fighting in the aftermath of the Croatian action to gain full control of U.N. Sector West and the Knin Serb retaliation on Zagreb and other areas. Ongoing clashes in Croatia, violations of agreements on cease-fires, separation zones and economic cooperation demonstrate the need for an effective U.N. peacekeeping presence there, as well.

These clashes could trigger a widening of the conflict and threaten the maintenance of U.N. peacekeeping operations throughout the region. Having helped persuade President Tudjman to maintain a new U.N. force of peacekeepers and border monitors in that country, we are working with our Contact Group partners and others to minimize the danger of renewed hostilities and advance the cause of a negotiated settlement. This includes encouraging the parties to agree to the U.N. force's expeditious implementation of a new mandate.

We have also redoubled our efforts in the past few months to support the Bosnian Federation, which remains the best hope for democracy and ethnic tolerance in the area. To date, our efforts have helped end the fighting and reopen humanitarian convoy routes in parts of central Bosnia thereby improving the prospect for long-term reconciliation between the Muslim and Croat communities there. We have been working with the 21 other governments who form the Friends of the Federation to expand international economic and political support to ensure that the Federation becomes a durable entity reflecting ethnic harmony and tolerance in that troubled region. Withdrawal of UNPROFOR here again would gravely damage our efforts to bolster the Federation.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, taken individually, each of these efforts may seem modest. Certainly they have not produced peace in Bosnia. But taken together on behalf of the international community, these actions do represent the substantial undertaking that many governments have committed forces and funds to conduct.

This administration is convinced the American people see our interests sufficiently at stake to warrant the United States doing its part to achieve peace in Bosnia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Please, Mr. Slocombe.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman, let me begin by thanking you for your statement about the rescue of Captain O'Grady. All Americans rejoice in this accomplishment of the skill, equipment, training, courage and faith of our Armed Forces and we all were very happy that in a situation where there is almost no good news, for

once we had one distinct piece of good news and we are all very happy for that.

The shutdown reminds us that this is a deadly serious business that cannot be addressed simply by emotion and I completely take Congressman Smith's point that this is not a partisan issue, this is an issue about what is right for the country and for our interests. The issues that I would like to focus on in parts of my statement—and you have the full statement for the record—are first potential uses and the limitations on the uses of U.S. forces; second, the measures that the British and French particularly, but other members of the UNPROFOR coalition have decided to take to strengthen UNPROFOR, finally, some of the difficulties with the unilateral lift approach.

Let me begin by saying that our policy is to keep UNPROFOR in and to keep the U.S. combat ground forces out. In that connection, the United States will not commit ground forces to the conflict in Bosnia or join the U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

Under this policy—and there has been a great deal of discussion of this in the last week or so—there are three strictly prescribed conditions under which we might use U.S. troops for discreet, temporary missions after consultation with Congress.

First, as a part of a NATO force to help implement a peace settlement, if one is reached, and the parties have demonstrated a willingness to comply with it. That, unfortunately, seems an extremely remote possibility.

Second, as part of a NATO force to help withdraw the U.N. peacekeeping force, if it and its commanders and contributing countries decide that it can no longer perform its mission and request NATO's help in withdrawing.

And third, as a last resort, if needed—and whether it would be needed is an open question because our allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves as I shall explain in a few minutes, they are taking steps to improve them.

Finally as a last resort, if needed, we would be prepared to consider sending U.S. troops to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR units whose positions have become untenable and moving them into points of safety in Bosnia where they could continue their mission. Any such operation would be short termed and aimed at specific projects, problems, and tasks.

Once this specific limited option were completed, our troops would withdraw immediately from Bosnia. The planning for possible withdrawal operations of all forms has been done at NATO, for this would be a NATO operation under NATO command and control, with NATO rules of engagement, and no U.N. dual key for the NATO forces involved.

OPLAN which goes by the designation 40104 provides in its full form for total withdrawal of the UNPROFOR force, requiring an extensive buildup, large numbers of troops, having the objective of pulling all equipment out and so on. General Clark will explain in more detail how the 40104 OPLAN would work. 40104 also has an emergency extraction potential.

That is for an in extremist operation conducted where circumstances do not permit the full 40104 operation. This element of

the plan could in principal be used for partial withdrawal; that is, withdrawing only part of UNPROFOR in an emergency.

That partial withdrawal could be to remove to withdraw units entirely from the region or leave them in some other part of Bosnia where they could continue as part of a reconfigured UNPROFOR to be further withdrawn. Given our desire for UNPROFOR to continue to operate, it makes sense to have sufficient flexibility in our plans for a partial withdrawal from untenable positions to operate in other parts of Bosnia.

These are all cases, for all or part of, if UNPROFOR finds itself in an untenable position in an emergency beyond UNPROFOR's own resources and requests and requires U.S. and NATO assistance to get out. We will not be in the position of providing a military transportation service providing a generally available quick reaction force for tactical use.

It is the quick reaction force mission which is why the British and French with other contributing countries have plans to create a rapid reaction force for UNPROFOR. In any event, the 40104 OPLAN is under continual update and review and would be tailored to the particular operations undertaken and the particular circumstances in which they had to be undertaken.

Any execution in NATO assistance to UNPROFOR withdrawal on any scale or any timetable would require decision by the North Atlantic Council in which each member of the NATO alliance, including, of course, the United States, has an effective veto and the United States' participation would require Presidential decision and congressional consultation. The reason that despite our determination not to participate in the ground operation of UNPROFOR that we have expressed our willingness to assist UNPROFOR in the ways I have outlined is straightforward.

We simply could not leave our allies in the lurch when our help could be critical and when they are engaged in the mission which has had our support. At least we could not leave them if we are to maintain an alliance and maintain our reputation for leadership and indeed for friendship with some of our oldest and closest allies.

Furthermore, the assurance that U.S. and NATO help could be available in the hypothetical event of an evacuation from Bosnia is an important element in persuading UNPROFOR contributing nations to be willing to keep their troops there carrying out their difficult but important mission.

Faced with the problems of recent weeks, the UNPROFOR contributor countries have so far rejected the choice of pulling out altogether and they have long rejected the choice of waging war on the Bosnian Serbs. Instead, they decided to strengthen the U.N. peace-keeping mission so it can do its job better.

The NATO defense ministers met in Paris on Sunday to develop plans for this strengthening. They decided that the key to the effort is to create a multinational rapid reaction force that would protect and support the force that is there now, to be in effect a militarily effective backup force.

For example, if the units escorting a convoy delivering food or fuel to civilians come under attack, they could call on this rapid reaction force who would quickly come to their assistance.



I want to be clear because the Europeans have been clear in offering to create this force. The force will not fundamentally change the nature of UNPROFOR and in particular will not convert it into a force whose purpose is to intervene as a combatant in the battle. It will continue to operate within its current mandate.

It will have neither the means nor the missions to seek to use military force to impose a solution or compel the parties to comply by force of arms. It will, however, give UNPROFOR significantly increased self defense capability which should make UNPROFOR more effective because it will mean that the commanders' efforts to secure acceptance of carrying out its role will be backed by more real military power.

The key contributors to this force would be British and French who will be contributing potentially as many as 10,000 troops to the force, given that the current UNPROFOR force in Bosnia is something in excess of 20,000 troops of varying qualities. This would represent a very substantial increase in the combat capability.

Several other nations have also indicated their interest in providing troops but the United States has been clear throughout the discussion that we absolutely will not be providing ground troops for this rapid reaction force. We will, however—we do, however, strongly support the objectives of this force and we will provide support in four different areas which are consistent with the kind of support we have provided UNPROFOR in the past.

First of all, we will continue to provide close air support through NATO. Second, we have offered to provide various types of equipment, such as helicopters, artillery-locating radar, communications gear, navigation systems and night-vision equipment.

Third, we have offered to provide lift, especially strategic airlift of forces and equipment, to the theater of operations. And finally we have offered to provide U.N. commanders in Bosnia with an intelligence coordination cell.

Under Secretary Tarnoff has made the case for a policy, which we are following, of seeking a diplomatic solution while supporting UNPROFOR as the best means available to serve our key interests, containing the geographic scope of the fighting and limiting its scale insofar as possible while ensuring the provision of humanitarian relief to the civilian population.

We are fully aware of the limitations of this approach and indeed it will not quickly end the war in Bosnia. Everyone who studies this as well as everyone who casually watches excerpts of the news on television finds this frustrating.

This frustration has led to proposals to take active measures to help the Bosnian Government achieve its political and military goals, including proposals for the United States to unilaterally lift the arms embargo. The strong vote in the House this afternoon to lift the arms embargo unilaterally reflects that frustration.

There is no question but that the Serbs are the guilty party in this war, that this war is an affront to civilization and that there is no prospect of early peace. This leads to a search for alternatives.

One of the members of this committee said in an opening statement that there are no easy answers but there are some bad an-

swers. Unilateral lift is not an alternative policy approach to the choices of pullout or intervention.

It would mean either a de facto pullout or a de facto entry into the war. The issue is not whether the arms embargo is a good idea and we should—we should resume, we should impose it if we had everything to do all over again. No one disputes that that is not the case.

The issue is, are we willing to look realistically at the consequences of unilateral lift. First of all, it would mean the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. That would mean the end of the current humanitarian relief effort.

It would be risky and would take time and money to arm the Bosnian Government forces. One cannot simply pass a law, authorize the State Department to issue export licenses and magically large, effective military units appear in central Bosnia. At a minimum it would take time.

During this time, the Serbs would have every incentive to press their current advantage in heavy weapons. Almost certainly they do not have the capacity to overwhelm all of Bosnia, but equally certainly they have the capacity to attack the enclaves in Sarajevo very, very effectively.

Unless somebody was prepared to step in and provide defense, the consequences are virtually certain. Even if the United States were prepared to provide air cover and when the administration advanced the idea of multilateral lift, we were honest enough to recognize that if we were going to do this, we had to have a U.S. and NATO commitment of air cover to cover this gap period before the Bosnians could be effectively armed.

Even if we were to rely on air cover, if the UNPROFOR forces were not on the ground, there would be no tactical controllers on the ground with adequate training to coordinate that air cover. One would have to address the question of whether we would be able to get NATO cooperation in bases for such air cover.

I don't expect that we will convince this afternoon, people who believe that unilateral lift is the right idea. All I can ask is that as we move toward a serious vote on these issues we address these issues of the realistic consequences of what we would do in the dilemmas which we would face. The view of the administration is that we cannot force a peaceful—and we do not choose to force because we do not have sufficient interest—a military conclusion to this war.

Only the parties can decide to end the war and we will continue our diplomatic efforts to encourage that. Meanwhile we will better serve both our interests and those of the people of the region adhering to the policy of trying to contain the fighting, limit the scale of the suffering, provide humanitarian relief and the key to this, at least for now, is keeping UNPROFOR in place. Thank you.

I have asked with the committee's permission, I would like to suggest that in addition to the other subjects he was going to cover, that General Clark could give a very brief summary of how the rescue operation was carried out which, I think, may be a matter of interest to the committee.

Thank you.



[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. General Clark, will you be kind enough to proceed?

**STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, DIRECTOR,  
STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to be here today, and I would like to begin by acknowledging, accepting your congratulations on behalf of General Shalikashvili and the Armed Forces. And I want to tell you that we in the joint staff were absolutely overjoyed at the rescue of our downed pilot.

We are tremendously proud of Scott O'Grady's personal courage and his character and we are also proud of the Armed Forces and particularly our own forces, our skill and professionalism that they demonstrated in participating in this operation. This operation was part of the well-understood responsibilities of those forces, all of our Air Forces know that when they are committed to these kinds of operations, it is an inherent responsibility of those forces to go in and get out their downed pilots and they were prepared to do that with a variety of plans.

All we needed was the contact with the pilot and when we got that positive contact, the plans were rapidly brought together, formalized through NATO and the combined air operation center there in the theater, the aircraft and forces were organized in a remarkably short time in the hours right after midnight local time all of that was pulled together.

Some 40 aircraft covering a range of functions, including suppression of enemy air defense and detection, the lift birds to go in to get out the pilot, the escort birds that went in with them and so forth, pulled together, established communications, went in on plan, found him, landed, picked him up, pulled him out. I think I can say we were acutely aware of the risks of an early morning daylight operation.

We needed to go get him. We did, and we got him out successfully.

As has been reported, there was some small arms fire coming out and the report of a launch of a hand-held air defense missile, but this was without impact and very quickly we got our pilot back on-board the *Kearsarge*. Pending a detailed report from our field commanders, I think that is about where I should leave that.

But I want to assure you that we, from the time this incident occurred, took a very careful look at it to see what lessons we had to learn from it in order to reduce the risks to our pilots and assure that we could continue to operate in the Deny Flight missions.

The F-16 that was shot down last week was part of a two-ship formation. It took off from Aviano Air Base at about 2 on the morning of June 2 last Friday. They were on a combat air patrol mission over Bosnia, but they were also armed in case they were called in to conduct close air support.

They were orbiting at about 21,000 feet when they were engaged by a truck-mounted Bosnian Serb SA-6. Two missiles were launched.

The first exploded between the two fighters who were flying some distance apart and the second missile struck the underbelly of the number two aircraft. The flight lead observed his wingman's aircraft as it began its descent but there was cloud cover so he lost sight in the cloud cover. Commenced search and rescue missions immediately.

You know that we worked for some time on this until we got the positive signal last night. The fighters were orbiting in an area there that had for 3 years had no history of known or suspected surface-to-air missile activity. These two F-16's were not accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses because of this fact and there had been some careful mission analysis and planning before they went in but that was the intelligence that the mission planning was based on.

Other flights that day, those that were operating over areas where there were known or suspected surface-to-air missiles were accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses. The command was simply following a standard tactical procedure of tailoring their air packages for the expected missions and threats.

Tactical judgments like this have been made for 3 years in that area for 69,000 sorties which is a remarkable testimony to the command's operational skills and acumen. But in light of this incident, Admiral Smith directed that all operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina must assume a surface-to-air missile threat regardless of the history of the area and they must be accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses in order to limit the future risk to NATO aircraft and that is the practice that is underway right now.

Now I would like to turn to the purpose and some of the details of NATO OPLAN 40104 to answer any particular questions you might have and to listen to your views and concerns. If we could have chart 1, please.

Let me start with a brief description of the area and the scale of the plan. I am confident that you are all very familiar with the territory of former Yugoslavia.

United Nations peace forces are located in Croatia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in Macedonia. Of the 38,500 man force from 35 contributing nations, some 22,500 are with UNPROFOR located in Bosnia-Herzegovina in positions that stretch throughout the breadth of the nation. They are distributed in many pockets, including those in and around the various enclaves and safe areas.

The road network logistics infrastructure in that region is limited, with very tough terrain. Much of it is mountainous. It is wooded, it is cut by gullies and streams.

A number of bridges and tunnels on the existing road networks and many of the UNPROFOR road units are in isolated and quite vulnerable positions. So when we were contemplating a secure withdrawal of these forces we knew that there would be obstacles and difficulties, difficulties arising in part because of UNPROFOR's widespread distribution, in part because of the logistics and intelligence difficulties that would be associated with a combat operation in that terrain and under those circumstances and in part be-

cause a withdrawal could become vulnerable to harassment and disruption.

So last August NATO asked—was asked by the U.N. to begin looking at a plan that would help it if it had to pull out. Chart 2, please.

The plan that has emerged has been shaped so that it could be used to withdraw U.N. forces from either Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, but today I will focus on the plans to handle the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is after all right now the most volatile area of U.N. operations.

The plan is flexible in that it is designed to accommodate either a deliberate withdrawal of all of UNPROFOR's forces or an emergency extraction. The most likely scenario for such an emergency extraction operation would involve the eastern enclaves where the situation has always been the most tenuous.

The execution of the deliberate plan would have to be triggered by UNPROFOR's request to the U.N. Security Council to withdraw its forces. This would be followed by a U.N. Security Council request to the North Atlantic Council to support such a withdrawal.

I should note here that the plan is limited to the withdrawal or extraction of UNPROFOR forces. It is not directed at providing humanitarian support or providing support for refugees either during or after the withdrawal operations, nor does it include any planning for subsequent operations by U.S. or NATO forces once a withdrawal has been completed.

But before I discuss the concept of the plan, I want to strongly emphasize the command and control arrangements and these command and control arrangements will be NATO command and control, a single chain of command using robust NATO rules of engagement, no dual key arrangement for NATO forces. At execution, all NATO, all forces in the area, including UNPROFOR, will fall under and remain under NATO command and control until those UNPROFOR forces are released back to the U.N. or their national command authorities.

Could I have the third chart, please?

We see the operation as being conducted sequentially in five phases. This is the most robust option here which is being briefed.

It could take up to 22 weeks to complete. First is a preparation phase.

The purpose in this phase is to establish the theater communications and logistics architecture and where possible to secure support for staging bases and needed facilities. While these initial steps are being taken, the forces designated for the plan will conduct training and other preparatory activities.

In the second phase, we are working on theater opening and deployment. In this phase, the logistics elements will deploy to establish logistics bases to open up port facilities for follow-on units. After the establishments of this logistics infrastructure, the main bodies of forces will conduct the—who will conduct the withdrawal will deploy into the theater and will assemble outside Bosnia.

Third is the execution phase. This is the critical phase of the operation. Combat forces will deploy into the interior of Bosnia to conduct withdrawal operations that will facilitate and safeguard



the movement of UNPROFOR units. This obviously is the heart of the plan.

In the fourth phase, reorganization, the UNPROFOR units will be moved to holding areas near ports of embarkation and released from NATO control back to U.N. or international authorities.

And finally the fifth stage, redeployment, NATO units will depart the staging locations and return to their home bases. In the event a situation arises requiring an emergency extraction, the plan has a quick response option using selected NATO forces that are in close proximity to Bosnia-Herzegovina. American participation and support for this plan are essential.

The plan is built to a large degree on capabilities that only we possess, but just as important our NATO allies who are even now in the process of increasing their contributions to UNPROFOR feel it is essential that there is a viable, workable, and supported plan capable of assisting the withdrawal of their forces in the event that becomes necessary. We believe the plan is militarily sound and we believe it is executable, because it will be executed under NATO command and control using NATO ROE and there will be no dual key for NATO forces. We are confident that the right arrangements will be in place to protect our forces and carry out our mission.

Let me add that we believe it is extremely—it is extremely important for NATO to have such a plan on the shelf and to be prepared to execute it. We cannot afford to wait until an unwelcome contingency arises before commencing solid preparations.

The approval of this plan in fact is the best insurance possible that it won't have to be carried out. It gives the UNPROFOR contributing nations the assurance that they must have to sustain their commitments in that very important and difficult mission.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks and I would be pleased, along with Secretary Slocombe and Secretary Tarnoff, to take your questions at this time.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, I want to thank our panelists for your very astute review of what occurred and where we are. Can I ask the panelists just what occurred between Wednesday when the President gave his speech at the Air Force Academy announcing he was prepared to offer troops to help the U.N. redeploy its forces in Bosnia and then the following Saturday when Secretary Perry announced U.S. ground forces would only be involved in the event of U.N. withdrawal in Bosnia.

Had there been some full review between those dates that necessitated this change of policy?

I will address that to any of the panelists.

Peter.

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, why don't I answer and then Under Secretary Slocombe, who was with Secretary Perry in Paris can amplify this.

We felt that the statements made reflected an overall position the administration has moved to, namely in light of the decision by the Europeans to reinforce their elements on the ground in the form of the rapid deployment force, it might be necessary for the United States in emergency situations to be available, again, in the rare occurrence that our assets were uniquely capable of being applied to an emergency extraction situation. This had not been a

prospect beforehand and it was really as a result of the change in European attitudes and their own plans that necessitated this extension of what had been our policy.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Slocombe or General Clark.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think one of the lessons of the last week is that this is not a problem or a planning process which lends itself to bumper stickers. The United States has taken the position explicitly since at least December of last year—and I recall being before this committee explaining when—what that approach was last December, that we would be prepared to assist, to consider assisting a NATO-led operation if it became necessary to extract the UNPROFOR forces from an untenable position. That has been the policy.

To explain what that means and to explain in detail what would be entailed takes a little while. I am told that the NATO plan is—what?—1,000 pages long, some fantastic stack of documents.

As Mr. Tarnoff says, in the light of the concern about some of the exposed positions, the question arose, granted we are willing to assist on an emergency basis in a total withdrawal, would we be willing to assist in a partial withdrawal, including a withdrawal in which the forces being withdrawn from some exposed position, presumably an enclave, are not going all the way back home, but would instead move to some other position in Bosnia where they could continue to operate.

We believed that it was an application of the policy which we had espoused before, but that the answer to that question had to be yes. So I don't think there was a change in fundamental U.S. policy, although certainly there was an application of it to a particular case that hadn't been discussed before.

Then what followed was a series of statements which by the nature of these statements have to be fairly brief which seemed to me not to change the policy, but got a lot of attention as to whether there were differences from one day to the next. I don't—I think I know what the underlying position was all along and I know there was no difference in the underlying position. It was the same position which Mr. Tarnoff and I and General Clark have articulated this afternoon.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Just one other thought. I mentioned it in my opening remarks.

I would hope that we could revise the kind of consultation that the administration has with the Congress so that there would be a better communication between the Congress and the administration.

I hope that you would look into that, Secretary Tarnoff.

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Slocombe, can you tell us where the intelligence cell that you mentioned might be provided? Where would we be locating that? What part of the portion of the area would you have in mind?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The short answer, I think the innuendo to your question is it would not have to be in Bosnia.

General Clark.

General CLARK. Planning is still underway for this and, as Secretary Slocombe said, we are not intending to put anyone in Bosnia

for this cell. There are a number of facilities available in the theater in which we can bring in our allies there and work with packaging this. The U.K. is a likely location for it. But again, there has been no final decision made on that. It is still in the planning stage, Congressman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. I am going to call on our members in the order in which they arrived.

I think it was Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Tarnoff, in your testimony you point out that in 1993 and 1994 we advocated multilateral action to end the embargo. Is the administration—is that past tense, advocated? Are we still advocating that?

Mr. TARNOFF. Yes, we do, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. What—how does that manifest itself? What are we doing to try to—I mean, from my conversations with some administration people, I get the sense that multilateral lifting of the arms embargo is a dead letter. Is that still an active option that is being pursued?

Mr. TARNOFF. Let me mention one or two things in connection with your question.

Last summer Secretary Christopher obtained an agreement on the part of the Contact Group ministers that multilateral lift of the arms embargo could be considered as a last resort. It was the first time that our other Contact Group members officially and publicly did acknowledge that there could be circumstances in which they would support multilateral lift.

Similarly, at the end of last year in early December, Ambassador Madeleine Albright, our permanent representative to the United Nations, actually introduced a resolution for consideration in the Security Council with a provision for multilateral lift. That resolution was not supported by a majority of members of the Security Council, but they certainly understood what our position would be.

Finally, we have made clear to our friends and allies that should it be necessary, contrary to our hope and expectation, were UNPROFOR to be extricated from Bosnia, the United States would believe and express its belief most forcefully that the time had come again to seriously consider multilateral lift.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you, in a May 12 letter to Mr. Gilman from President Bill Clinton, he says, “while I am opposed to providing combat-related training at the present time, we have taken steps to provide the Bosnians limited military training for the Bosnian Federation.”

It is my understanding that combat-related training does not violate the U.N. sanctions. I am somewhat perplexed as to why we would be against that in the first place especially in light of the Nunn-Mitchell provisions which had broad support in the Congress, and I think after today’s vote probably would have even more support in terms of training. I mean, the sense that we get in conversations is that the training would take a long time.

Well, months are going by when training could be provided at least to some of their top people. Doesn’t have to even be done in country, obviously would not be done in country, could be done in a number of safe areas for our troops.

Why isn't it being done?

Why is the President against training the Bosnians?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We are in the process of working with the Bosnian Government and the Federation on a plan for IMET, International Military Education and Training, and the judgment is that that should begin at the level which has been proposed and then work on that, get that base built and then make further decisions as to what makes sense and in our national interest.

Mr. SMITH. With all due respect, people are dying every day. They have requested help. As they have said, Dr. Siladzic said again today, you won't defend us and you would not allow us to defend ourselves. I think there—it should almost be a no brainer that there is not opposition on the Hill, I wouldn't think, to providing combat-related training.

I think there is agreement. The assessment has to be that their military does improve from one month to the next, that training would only enhance that capability, thereby providing additional deterrence to the—to the onslaught that I know is feared by some by the Bosnian Serbs. Why not make the diplomacy work all that much more by having a better trained Bosnian army?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I understand the point you are making and we will certainly convey that back through the system. All I can say is that at this point, the scale and character of training which has been approved, the arrangements of which are still being worked out are what would he think make sense in the present circumstance.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask when the President said, "while I am opposed to providing combat-related training at the present time," is that to suggest that that may change? Again, I wish it was not the case, but is that possibly a policy that is in flux?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I don't think the policy is in flux. This—this situation is such that and recognizing the Congress' interest in training, our judgment has been that combat-related training does not make sense in terms of our interest at this point. Whether—whether they might at some time in the future, I suppose, is a different question. I don't anticipate that it would.

Mr. SMITH. Have they requested training?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Oh, yes. They have requested—they have requested—their view of what is permissible under the arms embargo is quite broad and they have requested a variety of kinds of things. I would also have to observe simply as a legal question how much one can do consistent with the embargo is a matter of some debate.

Mr. SMITH. What is the administration's view of what is permissible under the embargo?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would have to get you a legal answer on that.

Mr. SMITH. Could we get that and, Mr. Chairman, make that a part of the record? I have no questions but I will come back on second.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Certainly.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

[The response follows:]



QUESTION FOR THE RECORD REGARDING PROVISION OF COMBAT-RELATED TRAINING TO  
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA UNDER THE U.N. ARMS EMBARGO

I have referred this question to the DoD Office of General Counsel, which has informed me as follows:

U.N. Security Council Resolution 713 stated the decision of the Security Council that "all States shall . . . immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise. . . ." Paragraph 7 of the Resolution further calls on all States "to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict."

The U.N. embargo does not by its terms prohibit the provision of training to Bosnia and Hercegovina. Indeed, the administration has determined that the provision of limited IMET training to the Bosnian Federation, as well as to Slovenia, FYROM and Croatia, does not violate the embargo. While it is clear that such foreign language and staff training is not violative of the embargo, the situation is less clear with respect to combat-related training. It could certainly be asserted that provision of combat-related training would run counter to the spirit and intent of the embargo, if not its letter.

In light of these concerns, the administration does not intend to authorize or provide particularly sensitive training in light of the arms embargo.

Mr. BEREUTER [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. ROTH.

Mr. ROTH. From what I can gather from your testimony, Mr. Slocombe, I appreciate all the three testimonies here. I think that you have a realistic viewpoint.

It seems to me what you are saying is, hey, this is a tough situation over there. And once you get involved, how are you going to get out.

You know, we had Secretary Christopher before our committee and he had four criteria. I always remembered those. The last one was once you get committed, how do you get out.

You know, General Clark, I listened carefully to your testimony. It seems to me what has happened is that UNPROFOR, when they went in there, they were going to bring peace but now all of a sudden they have become hostages. I mean, if we have to go in there and bring them out, then they are hostages, aren't they?

General CLARK. That has been the dilemma of the peacekeeping mission there from the beginning. It is like the commander told me the other morning, yes, they are all vulnerable to being taken hostage. That is the essence of this particular peacekeeping mission. They are standing around in the midst of other people's war.

Mr. ROTH. You know, from my experience here on Capitol Hill, you had mentioned you have this plan and it is going to take 22 weeks to bring this plan to conclusion.

Forgive me, but I was just chuckling a little bit because you know when I watch football games on Sunday afternoons the game starts at 12 noon, the coach is, hey, I have got this great plan, we have been practicing all week on this great plan, it is a great plan. Three o'clock the game is over, they say hey, what happened, coach? Well, when we started this game all of a sudden they came on with this left guard and they did this and we had to change our plan completely. Now if they do that in a football game and they have got 22 people running around out there, what is this poor general with 25,000 going to do?

General CLARK. If that is a question, can I take it?

Mr. ROTH. I just don't believe we can have a plan like that. I am sort of dubious about those things.



I sort of like Mr. Slocombe, he says, hey, let's not put our fingers in, we might get them chopped off. Everybody here on Capitol Hill I know is pushing, go in, go in, go in, but they will be the first one to scream get out, get out, get out, once you are in there. You know that.

And I am saying, hey, before we go in there, let's go in with all of our eyes open. How are we going to get out? How can we keep American people, their confidence, and how can we keep the support of the American people?

Christopher, one of his four points was you have got to have people's support when you go in. Hey, I go all over this country, I have never had one person walk up to me in an airport and say, Congressman, let's go into Bosnia. Quite to the contrary.

When I go to our parades, people say, hey, stay out of Bosnia. And so these four points I think have to be answered.

In fact, I wrote the President a letter. He probably never receives the letter, but I recounted those four points. I said we have to remember those before we go in. You are in a tough spot. I know you have got a tough job there. I would not want to be the general in charge of putting 25,000 troops in there and say we are going to hit them, get out and I have got this plan.

General CLARK. If I might respond to that.

First, I think we have got to be frank in acknowledging that any plan that involves the potential of opposition, that plan is the starting point for the execution of the operation. Our generals know that.

Within that framework, though, we believe the plan provides the resources that are required, provides the right framework to accomplish it. You raise the issue of exit and how do we get out.

I think this plan meets the test there because it specifies what the objective is. The objective is to help UNPROFOR withdraw. It has a five-phase program that concludes with the NATO forces coming out and the plan provides sufficient resources to fully do the job from a military perspective.

When we go in there, the intent is to go in there with enough combat power that we can intimidate the opposition and intimidate those who might otherwise seek to oppose us. So ideally we will get out of there with a minimum of harassment and we will get out of there on schedule.

Mr. ROTH. Well, you know, that sounds—forgive me but I have to speak frankly. That sounds like sort of a wish list.

You know, we had this—and I congratulate you for getting the pilot out. Thanks be to God we got him out. But you know, that pilot was down, that is one man. He was down on Friday. Today's Thursday. We got him out yesterday. It took us 5 days.

What are you going to do when you have about 25,000 people in there? See, I don't see—the thing, I don't believe that you can have a plan where you go into a country like that and say we are going to get those troops, we are going to move out because, like a football game, once you go in, all of a sudden things happen that you never even anticipated.

General CLARK. I—I agree with this aspect of what you are saying, Congressman. I think that this is going to be a very challenging and a very difficult operation.

But I think that is the nature of military operations and the nature of the plan is you have got to set it up with the right command and control, the right logistics infrastructure, the right amount of combat power, the right amount of intelligence so that the able commanders that we put in there can adapt to the changing circumstances and make it all come together and bring them out. And so it is from that perspective that we say that this is a workable plan, one that can be executed and one that we would seek your support on.

Mr. ROTH. Well, General, seek our support, my support would come along this avenue. Maybe there is another way of accomplishing the same objective without putting 25,000 Americans into that country. And if there is another way, maybe that is the avenue we should take. That would be my thinking.

General CLARK. We have looked at that, at the alternatives, and obviously we wanted to go with this thing from the smallest possible amount of force after NATO was asked to assist but the logic trail went this way: Those forces in there are forces largely of our NATO allies. They were not organized for combat when they went in. They were told to go in as peacekeepers.

So although you see the soldiers with the rifles and the blue helmets, what you are not seeing is you are not seeing the intelligence, the command and control, the fire support and all of the other accompanying assets that go to make up a military force. Those are military elements in there. They are not a military force.

So if they were seriously opposed as they attempted to withdraw, they would be unable to fight their way out if that were required. In fact, their weakness would invite opposition and harassment from the parties who might seek to keep them there to use them as hostages and so that is the reason why NATO was asked to support. What we put together here is a planning framework and a plan to get us in there and execute that support.

Mr. ROTH. Well, Mr. Chairman, just let me conclude by saying this. I just had a conversation with one of my staffers when the thing at O.J. Simpson trial began I said, I want you to get some legislation ready because by the time this trial is over with, you know the American people are going to be so fed up with the jury system that they are just going to be climbing the walls. Oh no, Congressman, something like that will never happen. I say, well, just go ahead and do it.

Now, of course, we see that that prediction was right. Let me say something.

If the American military, because all our institutions, are under attack today, the American military goes into Bosnia, you get caught up in there, the American people are going to be so upset, they are going to be so mad and you know who they are going to take it out on? Not on Congress. Not out of that group or that group.

They are going to go after the military this time and I love the military. I was on the board at West Point. I wore the uniform. I am concerned about how the military is going to come out of this and they are not going to come out well.

So I just wanted to say that so—thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your testimony. This is a hearing, and I think we need to make it clear that this is not consultation with Congress. I hear so much about consultation with Congress, but I almost never see consultation with Congress on critical decisions like those that we have had over several months with respect to the former Yugoslavia.

Your testimony is very helpful and I will give you some opinions so, to some extent, this is a start at consultation. But we need to have a dialog in closed quarters and privacy if you wanted to call it consultation. First of all, let me start with areas where I agree.

Secretary Slocombe and Secretary Tarnoff, you both expressed your concerns about unilaterally lifting the embargo, and I share those concerns. I have certainly voted against it today. I would have done everything possible to keep that vote from happening today.

I think that the anger and the anguish, anxiety and the anxiety it creates among our NATO allies and other forces in UNPROFOR must be very substantial. While I supported a multilateral lift, I would have supported it after we get the peacekeepers out.

If we have reached the conclusion that there is no peace to keep and UNPROFOR can't do its job, then perhaps a multilateral lift would be appropriate. But, of course, we are faced with an incredible moral dilemma that we are in effect a part of a one-sided embargo that denies the Bosnians the—particularly the Bosnian Government forces, mostly the Muslim—the right to defend themselves.

You have had some discussion here about President Clinton's comments at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs. I think you said, Secretary Slocombe, that is not really a change in U.S. policy. It was difficult in enunciating it in short and that may be true. It may not be a change in policy. But I certainly think it is an inappropriate policy decision to have reached.

It seems to me that if you are talking about reconfiguring under emergency conditions UNPROFOR forces, it is inevitable that American troops are going to be involved. American personnel will be there extracting people on helicopters. Once you start down that slope we are going to have our forces much more heavily involved.

I certainly agree with the idea of extraction of UNPROFOR if that is a decision that must be reached and as we move toward November it seems to me that is one of the logical things for the United Nations to consider and for us to have a major input in that.

But I think if Congress had been in session you would have found a much stronger outcry among us about what may have been a change in policy or may have been enunciation of a policy that had been set some time earlier.

I also think it is important to say that while the President has talked about sending in troops, and even with some fairly specific numbers from other administration sources, to implement a peace settlement, that has never been debated in Congress. That is not something on which Congress has signed off.

I hope that is clear. It just goes on and sometimes you may think that silence is acceptance. As far as I am concerned, that is not something that we have reached a conclusion upon here in the Congress.

I had an opportunity to speak in Budapest as the chairman of the House delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly and we were meeting a week ago Monday. It happened to be at the time when the hostages were taken in great numbers and so, quite naturally, the normal agenda for the meeting was to some extent set aside and we began discussing in detail the current situation in Bosnia.

In fact, we did something very unusual for a spring meeting. We set aside time for debate on a resolution that was offered by the British and perfected by the Spanish and the French. I would like to give you a few of the comments that I delivered in that.

I am going to just give you a couple of paragraphs because it represents my view, but I think it may come close to have represented the views of all 17 House Members and 4 Senators that were there. And I will just excerpt from it.

We must work together within the U.N. framework to firm up the UNPROFOR mandate and eliminate its ambiguity to the extent possible. We must examine an increasingly cumbersome and dangerous relationship between NATO and the U.N. in Bosnia. It is disastrously slow and only in my personal view Mr. Akashi is not the right man for this position. In my judgment, he has no discernible management style. He does not delegate any responsibilities. And that comes from people who have worked around him.

I went on to say,

Specifically we must allow military commanders on the ground more decisionmaking discretion, especially concerning the disposition, safety and well-being of peace-keeping troops. I have confidence in General Rupert Smith and his key multilateral officers.

In November, if UNPROFOR has not already been withdrawn and if the parties have not agreed on the outline of a peace settlement, we should then consider not renewing the current mandate as it expires. In approaching that decision, however, we must also recognize that the prospect of withdrawal of UNPROFOR may influence the warring sides in Bosnia to come to a negotiated settlement or withdrawing UNPROFOR may only be the prelude to a total bloodbath that will be appalling to the civilized world.

What will it be? There has never been a simple or easy solution to the conflict in Bosnia. There are none in the current crisis either. In conclusion, I would say that the present turn of events in Bosnia makes it plain that our policy and the means provided to conduct them are not bringing the conflict in Bosnia closer to an end.

It seems plain that either we alter our objectives and strategy or we must escalate UNPROFOR's resources and their use. And, parenthetically, the escalation by the British and the French, or the Special Forces, is happening and it seems to me to be a very appropriate action.

And the final paragraph that I will read you "Quite understandably, a great many people in my country"—as I was speaking to the other 15 NATO country parliamentarians—"and yours as well believe that it is the parties in the Yugoslavian conflict themselves who ultimately will decide whether to live or to die with one another."

In other words, they have concluded that we cannot force peace in Bosnia among people whose deep hatred set them to kill each other. In the end, the most the international community may be able to say about Bosnia is that we tried, albeit haltingly, inadequately and timidly because humanity demanded that the effort be made.

We adopted the resolutions with almost unanimous vote, but it is a small step to take and made us all feel very inadequate after having tackled this very thorny problem. I have one question and



then I will turn to my colleague and then perhaps another question after he is finished.

We have had a lot of discussion, General Clark, this week about the rules of engagement for our aircraft. Perhaps I missed it in the last day or two, but I haven't seen any clarification about the rules of engagement. To the extent that you can consider this question in open session, I would like to ask the concern that seems to be on people's mind and that is the rules of engagement are such that our pilots could not immediately take action against the missiles without some approval from NATO or perhaps even some dual key arrangement.

If that was the case, that troubled people. If, in fact, imminent danger seemed to be recognized in the cockpit, I think Americans expect the rules of engagement would enable that pilot to take every step and not just defensive, but in fact, overtly to take out the missile. Can you clarify that issue?

General CLARK. Congressman, I can. And the problem, frankly, from this case was not the rules of engagement. The problem was an absence of tactical intelligence data on historical presence of SA-6's in the vicinity of Bosanki Pretrovac prior to the date of the shootdown and a breakdown in threat warning communications. We thought we had a very good grip on this on where they were and what their patterns of deployment were and we were tailoring our air mission packages accordingly so that they, in effect, would be cognizant of the threat. And not recognizing that there would be a threat in that area, we sent those two aircraft in without the required accompaniment to be able to attack the enemy missile threat.

Had they had other equipment with them or the accompanying aircraft, they had adequate authority to have attacked that site.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General. That is reassuring and I would say to all three of you I have talked to you, maybe you think at you, about a number of things and it wouldn't be good conduct if I didn't give you a chance to respond to anything I have said, if you would care to, before I turn to Mr. Smith.

Mr. TARNOFF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to one or two of the comments that you made and to express at least my personal appreciation for the sensitivity which you have brought to this debate and your continuing interest in it, which we will try to do a better job to accommodate, as we will for other Members of Congress.

I think that you implicitly acknowledged that there are very hard choices involved here. Despite what our points of view may be on any side of any issue, some of which were talked about today, I think we, as Secretary Slocombe indicated, understand fully that there is a small margin between one side or another in terms of rights or wrongs or what we should be doing.

And I think that we take very seriously, as do our superiors in this administration, the need to make sure that the relationship and the dialog between the executive branch and the legislative branch is extraordinarily close in the coming weeks.

My sense is, and it is only a sense at this point, that something will change in the coming weeks and months. We sense from our European allies the same kind of frustration, maybe even more so

because they have men on the ground and we don't, that this situation cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely.

I think during the campaign, and since the assumption of office by French President Chirac, he has been outspoken to say that this cannot continue indefinitely and that is one of the reasons that the French were driven under his leadership to impose the reinforcement of UNPROFOR along the lines that have been described here.

So we are coming to a situation where hard choices can be made and we certainly accept your invitation to work very closely with you and other Members of Congress as we try to see our way through what the best policy would be for the United States. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Secretary Tarnoff, I thank you for your gracious remarks and response.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I only would add to that that I entirely take your point that being informed and having the opportunity to ask questions in a setting like this, while important, does not constitute consultation or approval. And that as we go forward to take some hard decisions, and, quite frankly, as the Congress considers whether it really will be our national policy to move to unilateral lift, we are going to have to find the mechanisms to do that in an effective way that allows us to address real issues and the very real concerns that are shared by those of us in the executive branch every bit as much as in Congress about wanting to figure out a way to resolve this problem, being conscious of the dangers of being sucked into a commitment beyond what we mean. And yet having to deal with a very real and very difficult problem.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I failed to notice Mr. Engel from New York. But he should be recognized and I do that.

Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend from Nebraska.

Secretary Tarnoff, in your testimony, and I want to just read one paragraph, you said:

Several weeks ago the Contact Group decided to explore an initiative, backed by Bosnian President Izetbegovic, that would tie Miloslevic's recognition of Bosnia and acceptance of tighter control over his country's borders with Bosnia and Croatia to sanctions suspension for Serbia.

And it was widely reported last week in the papers that we sent Mr. Frasure over there and *New York Times* has: "U.S. says it plans to propose new concessions to Serbia".

I have been, for virtually my entire 7 years in this Congress, talking about the people, the besieged Albanian community in Kosovo and trying to get some kind of recognition, some kind of U.S. support for the, I think, intolerances that they have been going through. I have been there. I have seen it firsthand. It is not getting any better. It is getting worse.

Secretary Christopher, yourself, the President of the United States, Mr. Frasure himself in various hearings before this committee and in press conferences at the State Department, in a letter that President Clinton sent to me just in January, have assured me that there would be no deal with Belgrade in terms of the lifting of sanctions unless the Kosovo question was taken into account.

And yet based on every report I have seen, based on everything I have read, based on everything I have explored, it seems to me

that once again the people of Kosovo are being sold up the river because there is not a mention of Kosovo.

We are going to, it seems to me, Miloslevic, hat in hand, saying to him, begging his forgiveness and saying to him, we are so eager to lessen the sanctions on his country. All he has to do is recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina and do some other things and no mention at all about Kosovo.

I am just thoroughly disgusted. I wish I had the letter with me from President Clinton whose foreign policy goals I do support, as you well know. Who I think on balance has been unfairly criticized in a lot of things. But you know, if you have a letter from the President of the United States and you have every important State Department official from the Secretary of State on down telling you this is going to be a priority, and don't worry, Congressman, this is going to be part and parcel of anything we do with Belgrade and then it is just discarded, what are we supposed to do?

Mr. TARNOFF. Congressman, let me try to make a distinction which I hope will be helpful in explaining our position. What Ambassador Frasure was talking to Mr. Miloslevic about was not a lifting of sanctions. It was a partial suspension of sanctions for a period of time. When I say partial, there were many sanctions that will remain on unless and until there was a much broader settlement.

We have made clear to Miloslevic and to the international community that there can be no permanent, and I repeat permanent lifting of sanctions, as opposed to partial suspension of sanctions, unless there is a resolution of the situation between Serbia and Croatia.

And second, you are absolutely right. A verification of intentions with respect to Serbian actions in Kosovo and Vojvodina. These items remain very much on our agenda, but what Mr. Frasure was doing was talking about only the partial suspension of sanctions in return for the recognition of Bosnia.

Mr. ENGEL. Doesn't the partial removing of sanctions really lessen the leverage we would have on Miloslevic ultimately? So isn't it really, you know, in reality it is partial lifting, but in reality, by partially lifting it, we are actually, you know, allowing the situation which from everything I have seen, a very dire circumstance economically. We are really letting him off the hook.

We conducted hearings last Congress on the Subcommittee on Europe and Middle East when we still had that subcommittee in this committee and I conducted those hearings and we talked about no lessening of sanctions at all unless the Kosovo issue was dealt with. So we are kind of inching a little bit away from that. And my fear is by lessening sanctions, we are in essence giving in and once again Kosovo is just falling by the wayside.

Mr. TARNOFF. Here again I can reassure you with respect to the fact that we are all very mindful of the commitments that we have made with respect to Kosovo, but on the question of the partial suspension of sanctions, let me say with the full approval of the Bosnian Government, we and our Contact Group partners and the greater majority of the troop-contributing countries felt that it would be potentially significant enough for the peace process if Miloslevic were to recognize Bosnia, that some limited benefits



should accrue. But where the conversations between Frasure and Miloslevic broke down and that is why they have been temporarily suspended is over the point that I believe you raised at least implicitly.

We insist that the United States in particular be able to make a determination with respect to the way the Miloslevic regime is conducting the commitments made. And if in our view Miloslevic is reneging on whatever deal has been worked out, the United States, through its veto in the Security Council, wants to retain the ability to have those sanctions reimposed.

Mr. ENGEL. Isn't he reneging on his deal to cutoff supplies to the Bosnian Serbs? I mean they are getting through. Clearly, he is made some moves to cut them off, but the people that I have questioned think that he is having it both ways. That, yes, there have been some overt moves to cutoff the supplies, but covertly things are going through. He knows they are going through and he is not really doing what he could be doing to prevent them going through.

Mr. TARNOFF. The system is far from perfect. We have 50 monitors on the ground. We have people reporting not only through the international mechanism, but directly to the administration and we have determined, although there is some evidence to the contrary, that there is substantial compliance by Miloslevic in his pledge to restrict the passage of nonhumanitarian goods between Bosnia and the Serbian-held positions and Serbia itself.

Mr. ENGEL. We have also discussed many times, and I continue to raise it each time, the establishment of the USIA office in Pristina in Kosovo and I get, every time I ask the question everyone thinks it is a good idea and they are going to look into it and see what can be done.

I know that there are offices closing around the globe and that money is tight and there is a pinch, but it would seem to me that we need to show something, some kind of gesture to those people, to the Albanians, 90 percent of the population of Kosovo, that we haven't abandoned them.

And if we are at least not going to mention this when we are talking about deals that we are cutting with Miloslevic, there is not even a mention of Kosovo, we wanted a clarification—even a clarification would be helpful at this point. Not necessarily a resolution. I know that a resolution will take a long time, but a clarification. At least if we were to point out that we are dissatisfied with the situation there, and having an American presence on the ground, I think would be a very big boost to that population of Kosovo to let them know that we in America are monitoring, we are watching, we are concerned and we are not having the wool pulled over our eyes. And I think that is very important.

I keep hearing nonsense about, well, we fear for the safety of our personnel in Pristina and that is the reason why we haven't opened the USIA office. That is nothing more than a phony baloney excuse as far as I am concerned. We have diplomats going in and out of there now from Belgrade. It is not any more unsafe there than it is in lots of other places where we have USIA offices. I really reject that nonsense and I would like to hear what is the safety concerns and I would like some assurances that we are moving to open an office.



Mr. TARNOFF. Congressman, I had not been aware of a specific proposal and I will respond more fully after we have had a chance to consider it. But let me make one or two points in this connection.

First of all, as you know, we were very concerned and protested vigorously and publicly when Miloslevic expelled the then, CSCE monitors from Kosovo a little over a year ago. We have always advocated a greater international presence in that area and there are many opportunities, not enough, but many opportunities for U.S. diplomats to visit Kosovo.

With respect to a permanent U.S. presence there, I can't tell you because I don't know what the factors have been. But I will respond very quickly to you. As you know, because it is part of Serbia, this would require the acquiescence of the Miloslevic government for any international presence and certainly U.S. diplomatic presence to be established there.

Mr. ENGEL. That kind of proves my point. If we don't raise Kosovo in the context of all the things we are doing with Miloslevic, you know, we are never going to get to first base.

And let me just finally conclude since my colleague, Chris Smith, is here and say that the bill that was just passed on the floor, I didn't vote for a number of other reasons. But the bill that was just passed, it is to his credit that as chairman of the subcommittee for the first time ever we got language into a bill that talked about opening the USIA office in Pristina.

And so now the Congress, at least the House, is on record as saying that we favor that. And I want to take this opportunity publicly to thank you Chris and thank you. And I would like to continue the dialog. Not necessarily here, but whenever, because I really want to make sure that Kosovo is not out of the eye of our concern.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman. The time is 6 o'clock so I think if I could ask the gentleman for one brief question.

Mr. SMITH. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just a couple of questions. It is very important to get this on the record.

Mr. BEREUTER. Be as brief as you can.

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Egelburger made it clear in his view Mr. Miloslevic was a war criminal. Undiplomatic perhaps, but I thought very candid. Many of us who have followed this from day one have a very similar sense and perception of his activities. And activities of many of the leadership in both Bosnia and, of course—the Bosnian Serbs, I should say, and many of the Serbians themselves.

In the conversations with Mr. Miloslevic, has either the U.S. side or any of our allies raised the issue in connection with the War Crimes Tribunal of immunity, or anything that might be construed to be immunity, for his cooperation?

Mr. TARNOFF. None whatsoever.

Mr. SMITH. You saw in the *Washington Post* two back stories: "Policy Zig-Zags Cited As Sign of Political Weakness." "Clinton's Bosnian Policy Leaves U.S. Allies Puzzled."

It starts off by saying that President Clinton's vacillation in recent days over putting U.S. troops in Bosnia has left European leaders troubled and both articles talk about the sense of flip-flops and zig-zags and people not knowing what the President meant,

which is not uncharacteristic. And I say that with all due respect to this particular President.

Did the Post get it wrong in these two stories? I am sure you read them. Ann Devereaux wrote one of the stories, the other is from Paris. Were these accurate stories or were they off the mark?

Mr. TARNOFF. I don't think they were accurate stories and even a distinguished paper like the *Washington Post*, Congressman, does get it wrong. I think that what, as Secretary Slocombe indicated, the press was reacting to was a very short reference to a very complex situation.

As was explained about the time the President made his initial remarks and explained in greater detail since that time, including by Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, there was a situation developing in Bosnia that our principal NATO allies were responding to. And in connection with their commitment to do more to put more people on the ground, to expose themselves to the possibility of greater dangers, this meant that certain questions were being asked of us that had not been asked before.

And I think that our answer, quite frankly, has been not a source of confusion, but a source of comfort to these allies.

Mr. SMITH. Well, the articles would indicate otherwise. But let me just say today, Secretary—or Prime Minister Siladzić made a claim and this is his quote: "All the arguments against lifting the arms embargo have failed the test in Bosnia's laboratory of death. The arms embargo is, quote, 'illegal and immoral' and, after 3 years, inhuman."

Today's vote, I think, reflects that. It is not just a matter of frustration, which I think one of you gentlemen mentioned earlier. Some of us thought it was wrong from the get-go and said so because the victim and the country that had been invaded, first the Croats and then Bosnia, did not have the means to defend themselves and the Serbs did and they were the aggressors.

But let me raise one final question. Again, getting back to that May 12 letter from the President. What steps have been taken to provide the Bosnians "limited military training through the Bosnian Federation?" What exactly are we talking about? How much is the IMET program? What are the particulars on that?

To the best of my knowledge, there has been no—I mean I have checked with staff. Nobody knows anything about it in terms of particulars. As a matter of fact, this letter, although dated May 12, has just arrived to those who were cosigners of that letter that went to the President. So you know, let's blame the mails for that one. What does that IMET program look like?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Rather than attempting to answer that off the top of my head, let's get a full answer for the record.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

[The response follows:]

In April of this year—in accordance with section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended—the U.S. Government submitted a diplomatic note to the Bosnian Government and a side letter to the Bosnian Federation, requesting assurances that any training provided would not be passed to third parties. To date, we have not received the response from the Bosnians that would permit us to go forward with establishing an International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Once these assurances are received, we will notify Congress of our intention to proceed with the program.

In anticipation of a favorable response, we have set aside \$70,000 for the first year of a Bosnian IMET program in fiscal year 1995, and we have requested \$200,000 for fiscal year 1996. Typically, the funding for the first year or so of an IMET program is used for fundamentals such as orientation tours of training facilities in the United States and English language training for prospective English language instructors. After that, the IMET program would provide training in civil-military relations, resource management, military justice and human rights, and professional military education. These kinds of courses are extremely popular in Central and Eastern Europe, where there is a real hunger for information about how Western militaries function in democratic societies.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, I will conclude with just a very brief statement or question. General Clark, you mentioned that, as I understood it, there will be no dual key arrangement on any kind of NATO evacuation of UNPROFOR forces and I hope that is the case. I know that is the overwhelming sentiment in the NATO countries parliamentarians and certainly the Congress.

It is our view also that it ought to be overwhelming force used if necessary to extract the personnel. Anything approaching any kind of a dual key arrangement or any involvement of the United Nations is unacceptable.

And finally, it seemed to me when I visited Admiral Boorda, who once wore the command hat at the Naples facility, it seemed to me they had multilateral NATO intelligence cell in place there already that was very effective.

Gentlemen, I want to thank all three of you and the delegations that you brought with you as support for your appearance here for the time you have given and to say to you that we appreciate your testimony in response to staying. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 6:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



# APPENDIX

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## **The Statement of the Honorable Peter Tarnoff Under Secretary for Political Affairs U.S. Department of State**

### Overview

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee to discuss the Administration's views and policies on Bosnia. As you know, Secretary Christopher had hoped to be able to appear before you, but his travel schedule this week, which included Haiti and the Middle East, made it impossible to find a mutually satisfactory time. I bring you his regards.

Today, my colleagues and I will address three main issues: our strategy for dealing with the conflict in the Balkans, which remains unchanged; how we view recent developments; and our continuing support for UNPROFOR, which is consistent with U.S. interests.

I will address our overall goals and diplomatic strategy.

Under Secretary Slocombe will then discuss the meetings last weekend in Paris among Ministers and military Chiefs of Defense from NATO and EU countries and how the steps they endorsed will strengthen UNPROFOR. Under Secretary Slocombe will also outline current and possible future U.S. military operations in the region.

Then Generals Clark (and Estes) will address a number of operational military questions related to our support to UNPROFOR under various circumstances.

### U.S. Interests in the Balkans

Our principal goals in the Balkans remain to contain and help bring to an end the ongoing conflicts which threaten our interests in European stability and integration.

From the outset of these conflicts, we have sought to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic state, support the peaceful restoration of Croatian sovereignty throughout the country, assist the peacekeeping and other activities of our NATO allies and UN, and relieve the human suffering.

To achieve these ends, we have led efforts to achieve negotiated settlements, led NATO military responses to calls by the UN for assistance in protection of its forces and safe areas for the people of Bosnia, deployed peacekeeping troops in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history.

Despite many disappointments and frustrations, the international community's efforts have yielded significant benefits. UNPROFOR's presence has diminished the level of killing. NATO's operation DENY FLIGHT, which enforces the "No Fly Zone" has ended aerial bombardment of cities. UNPROFOR provides transport, drivers, and logistic support to the UNHCR in the delivery of essential relief to 2.2 million people throughout the former Yugoslavia, including 787,000 refugees and displaced persons. The war between the Croats and the Muslims was brought to an end in March 1994 with the formation of the Federation, which



has sharply reduced the need for humanitarian relief. UNPROFOR has also performed well in monitoring the peaceful implementation of the Washington accords between the Muslim and Croats. The monitors that we and other members of the ICFY deployed on the border between Bosnia and Serbia/Montenegro have reduced the Bosnian Serb Army's ability to wage war over the past year. Without these UN and national programs, the situation would have been much worse in Bosnia.

#### The Search for Political Settlement

Our diplomatic goal in Bosnia remains to end the war consistent with the internationally-agreed Contact Group effort.

Several weeks ago, the Contact Group decided to explore an initiative, backed by Bosnian President Izetbegovic, that would tie Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia and acceptance of tighter control over his country's borders with Bosnia and Croatia to sanctions suspension for Serbia.

Last month, Contact Group representatives met in the Hague to review this initiative, and agreed the U.S. Ambassador Robert Frasure should travel to Belgrade to discuss further Belgrade's recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bolstering of the monitoring regime along the Serbia-Bosnia border, and the nature of sanctions suspension to be granted by the U.N. in response to these steps. Although we have made some progress in these discussions with Milosevic, he continues to demand a more unqualified formula for sanctions suspension than we can support. Ambassador Frasure left Belgrade yesterday to consult with the Contact Group representatives and the Bosnian government, as well as with his own government.

We have consistently advocated an incremental approach that offers limited initial relief, with significant incentives for further steps, all reinforced by the ability to reimpose sanctions if Belgrade does not abide by its part of the bargain.

We have engaged in this dialogue with Milosevic because we think he can play a useful in bringing about a peace settlement in Bosnia. For the past several months, Belgrade has distanced itself from the policies of the Pale leadership, both by closing its border with Serb-held Bosnia and most recently by Milosevic's condemnation of the hostage taking by Pale and efforts to secure their release. By recognizing Bosnia, Milosevic would frustrate the dreams held by many in Pale of merging the territory under their control to Greater Serbia, thus enhancing the chances that Pale would negotiate seriously with the Bosnian government.

We do not expect Milosevic to "deliver" the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table single handedly. The Serbs in Pale have a large measure of political independence from Belgrade, so much so that Milosevic views Karadzic more as a rival than a partner. However, Belgrade exercises substantial persuasive influence with Serbs in Bosnia, as witnessed in Belgrade's partially successful efforts to win release of the UN hostages. Should Belgrade agree to the recognition package under discussion, this influence would fall squarely behind the Contact Group efforts to bring the parties back into negotiations.

#### Detained UN Personnel

In recent days, the Administration has worked closely with Contact Group partners and

the UN to secure both release of UN personnel held by the Bosnian Serbs and further information on the U.S. F-16 pilot shot down last Friday. We have endeavored to ensure the immediate and unconditional release of all UN personnel. As of June 7, 229 of the detainees have been released by Bosnian Serb forces. Another 149 UN personnel are still being detained or blocked in their positions. Efforts to secure their release are ongoing.

#### Support to Allies and UNPROFOR

We believe UNPROFOR's mission should continue, if at all possible, because of the substantial contributions it has made to assist the people of Bosnia. Withdrawal now would trigger an even worse humanitarian disaster, including many Allied casualties and risk of spill over of the conflict. But in order to remain, UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. Under Secretary Slocombe and General Clark will elaborate on the measures to achieve this end endorsed by Defense Ministers and Military Chiefs of Staff at their meeting in Paris last weekend.

We are convinced that these steps to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to protect itself offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions. These efforts are not designed to set the stage for withdrawal of UNPROFOR. On the contrary, our European Allies have demonstrated their resolve to do more to make this mission work. They are determined to ensure that humanitarian relief efforts get through to those in need and to maintain a presence that will continue to mitigate the level of violence. Only if such conditions prevail can efforts to find a peaceful solution to continue.

As the President noted, we have a longstanding commitment to help our Allies by using our unique military capabilities to support a NATO-led operation to withdraw all or part of UNPROFOR safely from Bosnia, should that become necessary. Last week, the President said we would assist NATO, as requested, in emergency operations to extract certain units serving with UNPROFOR to safe locations in Bosnia. We do not expect there to be much demand for such support, as my colleagues will explain.

To reiterate, should the President consider it necessary to commit U.S. ground forces in emergency situations, for either emergency extraction or withdrawal, I can assure you that there would be close consultation with members of Congress and that the President would seek the support of Congress as well as the American people.

#### Lift the Embargo

We have always felt the UN arms embargo unfairly penalizes the Bosnian government, which is the victim of Serb aggression. In 1993 and 1994, we advocated multilateral action to end the embargo, but lacked sufficient support in the UN Security Council. In compliance with the Nunn-Mitchell Amendment, we have ended our participation in enforcement efforts against Bosnia, but continue to honor the arms embargo.

We still firmly oppose unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. It would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome, for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. Such a conflict would cause major strains in NATO and the UN and risk direct confrontation with Russia, which along with Serbia, might choose to provide military assistance

to the Bosnian Serbs. It would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such as Iraq and Libya, that serve critical U.S. interests. I know Under Secretary Slocombe wants to address this issue further.

#### Other Efforts

Our efforts to stabilize the situation in Bosnia are complemented by several other initiatives.

In Croatia we are working with the parties and the UN to prevent escalation of fighting in the aftermath of the Croatian action to regain full control of UN Sector West and the Knin Serb retaliation on Zagreb and other areas. Ongoing clashes in Croatia and violations of agreements on cease-fires, separations zones, and economic cooperation demonstrate the need for an effective UN peacekeeping presence there. These clashes could trigger a widening of the conflict and threaten the maintenance of UN peacekeeping operations throughout the region.

Having helped persuade President Tudjman to maintain a new UN force of peacekeepers and border monitors in Croatia, we are working with Contact Group partners and others to minimize the danger of renewed hostilities and advance the cause of a negotiated settlement. This includes encouraging the parties to agree to the UN force's expeditious implementation of a new mandate.

We have also redoubled our efforts in the last few months to support the Bosnian Federation, which remains the best hope for democracy and ethnic tolerance in the Balkans. To date our efforts have helped end the fighting and reopen humanitarian convoy routes in parts of central Bosnia, thereby improving the prospects for long-term reconciliation between the Muslim and Croat communities there. We have been working with the 21 other governments who form the Friends of the Federation to expand international economic and political support to ensure that the Federation becomes a durable entity and a model of ethnic harmony and tolerance in this troubled region. Withdrawal of UNPROFOR would gravely damage our efforts to bolster the Federation.

#### Overall Assessment

Taken individually, each of these efforts may seem modest. Certainly they have not produced peace in Bosnia. But taken together and on behalf of the international community, these actions do represent a substantial undertaking that many governments have committed forces and funds to achieve. This Administration is convinced that the American people see our interests sufficiently at stake to warrant the U.S. doing its part to achieve peace in Bosnia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



**Statement by Walter B. Slocombe  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

**Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
House International Relations Committee  
8 June 1995**

I am pleased to be here to discuss U.S. policy on Bosnia, and to inform you of the results of a meeting that Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili attended in Paris last Saturday with their counterparts from the NATO and European Union countries that contribute to, and support, the UN operations in Bosnia. The outcome of that meeting was agreement on a Rapid Reaction Force that will substantially upgrade the capability of the UN peacekeeping force. This is a welcome development, and we have pledged to make available to the new force certain U.S. equipment and capabilities that will enhance its capacity to operate.

Overall U.S. Policy

Let me begin by outlining the overall U.S. policy on Bosnia. Our policy consists of four elements: First, to not take sides in the war as a combatant. Second, to be fully engaged in the diplomatic effort to reach a negotiated peace settlement, which preserves Bosnia as a state within its internationally recognized borders. Third, to keep the war from spreading. Fourth, to mitigate and reduce the impact of the violence on innocent civilians. And as we pursue this policy, we will do so in a way that contributes to unity with our NATO allies.

Our goal is to protect U.S. interests in the region and more generally. It is true that we do not have "vital" national security interests in Bosnia. But we do have a security interest in preventing the violence from spreading and from stimulating a broader European war. Such a spreading conflict would threaten European stability and make direct U.S. involvement all but inevitable. We do have a security interest in limiting the violence and the flow of refugees. And we certainly have a humanitarian interest in mitigating the violence. So walking away is not an option.

At the same time, we are not going to take sides in the war as a combatant. That is not to say we have no point of view about this war. We recognize that the aggressors are the Bosnian Serbs, and that the victims are the Bosnian government and their people. Some have argued that it follows from this recognition that America has a moral obligation to see that justice is done by entering the war as a combatant on the Bosnian government side. One can respect the moral aspect of this argument, but the Administration and the

Department of Defense do not accept the conclusion, based on three separate judgments:

In the professional judgment of our military leaders, shared by the civilian leadership of DoD, joining the war to secure Bosnian success would entail the commitment of several hundred thousand troops, a long war, and thousands of casualties. Further, in the judgment of the Administration, the Bosnian war simply does not pose a threat to U.S. interests grave enough to risk the lives of thousands of our troops. And in any event, there is no support among the public or in the Congress for entering this war as a combatant.

#### Potential Use of U.S. Forces

Let me reaffirm that the U.S. will not commit ground forces to the conflict in Bosnia or join the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

However, there are three strictly prescribed conditions under which we might use U.S. troops for discrete, temporary missions -- and then, only after consulting with the Congress:

- First, as part of a NATO force to help implement a peace settlement, if one is reached.
- Second, as part of a NATO force to help withdraw the UN peacekeeping force if it decides that it can no longer perform its mission and requests NATO's help in withdrawing. This is the essence of NATO's preplanned withdrawal operation known as OPLAN 40104. (LTG Clark will outline the status of 40104.)

That plan has sufficient flexibility that, besides supporting a pre-planned total withdrawal, NATO could respond to the remote possibility that the UN could ask NATO to help in an emergency extraction of all or part of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. We do not expect that to happen, especially in light of the latest steps taken by key allied troop contributors to strengthen UNPROFOR's ability to defend itself.

- Third, as a last resort, if needed -- and whether it would be needed is an open question because our allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we would be prepared to consider asking U.S. troops to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR units whose positions had become untenable to points of safety in Bosnia. Any such operation would be short-term and aimed at specific problems and tasks.

Once a specific limited operation were completed, our troops would withdraw immediately from Bosnia. But let me be clear on this: the United States will

not become UNPROFOR's transportation service. And let me also be clear that we have not been asked to undertake a commitment to assist in emergency relocation--or any of these other contingencies. We think that it is unlikely that we will be asked to do so, in part because our willingness to consider such a request has given UNPROFOR a greater sense of confidence.

In any of these cases, any U.S. role would be subject to Congressional consultation, and would be through NATO, not the UN. There would be robust rules of engagement, a militarily sound plan able to accomplish the mission and deal with any contingencies. The mission of U.S. troops would be to render temporary withdrawal assistance; they would not become a permanent replacement for UNPROFOR.

The reason we have expressed our willingness to assist UNPROFOR in these ways is straight-forward: We simply cannot leave our allies in the lurch when our help could be critical. The assurance of U.S. and NATO help in a hypothetical evacuation from Bosnia is an important element in persuading UNPROFOR-contributing nations to keep their troops in Bosnia.

### Diplomacy

Under the diplomatic prong of our policy, we will continue to fully engage in the diplomatic effort to reach a negotiated peace settlement. Some have said this is a failed policy, because the war continues. But it is easier to criticize the peace negotiations than to actually achieve a peace settlement in Bosnia. And the peace negotiations have, in fact, yielded some progress -- for example, the Croatian-Muslim accord last year, spearheaded by efforts of Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Redman. The stakes are great, so we must keep trying, while at the same time, keeping our expectations in check, and recognizing that real progress may take a long time.

Our policy in the Balkans recognizes the tragic fact that the war will end only when the parties themselves conclude that their interests are served better by a negotiated settlement than by continuing the war. In the meantime, we seek to minimize the level of violence and limit its spread while allowing the diplomatic process to continue.

Diplomacy is nothing without leverage. The central means of pressure on the Serbs are the UN economic sanctions, which the U.S. joined in enforcing ever since 1992. Besides naval ships in the Adriatic, the US has civilian personnel

helping to enforce the sanctions effort on the Danube and civilians under DoD contract helping the ICFY effort to monitor the closure of the Serbian-Bosnian border.

### What We Have Accomplished

The other two prongs of our policy, besides diplomacy, are preventing the spread of the war, and reducing the impact of the violence. Both prongs have been successful. That's self-evident when it comes to preventing the spread of the war because, in fact, the war has not spread. This is a very important success, because if the conflict in Bosnia were to spread into a wider regional war, it could threaten to engulf our NATO allies Greece and Turkey. This would threaten our vital national interests.

But while the war has not spread, we cannot be complacent. Which is why U.S. troops will continue to participate in the UN peacekeeping force in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and why our diplomats have worked so hard -- and so far, so successfully -- to keep the UN force in Croatia, and prevent a resumption of widespread fighting there.

We have also been more successful than is usually realized in limiting the violence and civilian casualties. The key to this success has been the UN peacekeeping operation, supported by NATO. Nineteen nations have provided about 23,000 troops in Bosnia to reduce the level of violence on civilians, and to mitigate the effects of the violence by ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This is a tremendous outpouring of international support, and a clear demonstration that the world takes the crisis in Bosnia seriously.

The UN has been criticized for being ineffective or even counterproductive. Granted, the peacekeepers have had their problems, given the great difficulty of their mission. I doubt, if we could do everything all over, with perfect hindsight, anyone involved in Bosnian issues would advocate doing everything exactly the same. But in the face of this great difficulty, the peacekeepers have done a tremendous job in minimizing civilian casualties and relieving human misery. The widespread starvation predicted in 1992-1993 has been averted. In 1992, before the peacekeepers and the relief effort they support arrived in full force, there were about 130,000 civilian casualties in Bosnia. Last year, there were fewer than 3,000. Three thousand civilian casualties is still a tragedy, but the selflessness and courage of these peacekeepers has made a critical difference. If the UN force comes out of Bosnia, we'll turn the clock back to 1992, and we could again see annual casualties in excess of 100,000 civilians.



So, in spite of the criticism of the UN force, it has saved tens of thousands of lives. NATO has played a critical role in the success of the peacekeepers' humanitarian mission. Six NATO nations, including the United States, have been participating in operations providing airlift and air drop of food and medicine when UN humanitarian convoys cannot get through. NATO also provides, on request from the UN, close air support to protect the peacekeepers from attack and air interdiction--under operation Deny Flight--to stop the bombing of cities.

We've conducted thousands of sorties, more than 60,000 sorties in Deny Flight alone. These missions have not been risk-free. During these 60,000 sorties, there have been two aircraft shot down, one British last year, and just a few days ago, the American F-16. The risks will remain, but the value of Deny Flight is unquestionable in terms of the thousands of civilians saved from the shelling and bombing that would otherwise have occurred. So during 1993 and 1994, the UN force, with increasing support from NATO, became increasingly effective in reducing civilian casualties.

### Recent Events

During early 1995, Bosnia had settled into a virtual military stalemate, but a stalemate in which the momentum seemed to shift away from the Bosnian Serbs and toward the Bosnian government. In the face of this, the Bosnian Serbs brutally upped the ante by harassing the peacekeepers and by launching a rain of shells on innocent people in Sarajevo, more than 1,000 in one day.

This was incompatible with the UN peacekeeping mission and left the UN with a choice: either to give up the peacekeeping mandate and withdraw the peacekeeping forces, or call in NATO air support to conduct air strikes. The UN decided to call in the NATO air support, and NATO responded. In making this request, the UN commanders were fully aware of the risk that the Bosnian Serbs would retaliate, including by taking hostages and shelling cities. But that risk had to be balanced against the risk that the Bosnian Serbs would continue to slaughter the civilian population if NATO air support was not called in. I believe the UN made the right decision. And the NATO air strikes were the right thing to do. Bosnian Serbs should not be given free rein to slaughter innocent civilians or harass the peacekeepers.

The Bosnian Serbs responded by shelling Tuzla and taking UN peacekeepers hostage. Given the escalated Serb aggression, the international community had three choices: First, to pull out the UN peacekeeping mission; second, to insert a military force to wage war on the Bosnian Serbs; or third, to strengthen the UN peacekeeping mission.

## UNPROFOR Responses

They rejected the choices of pulling out the UN peacekeeping mission, or of waging war on the Bosnian Serbs. Either of these choices would have led to a humanitarian disaster. Instead, they decided to strengthen the UN peacekeeping mission so it can do its job better. The NATO defense ministers met in Paris on Saturday to develop the plan for strengthening the UN force. We decided that the key to strengthening the peacekeeping force is to create a multinational Rapid Reaction Force that would protect and support the peacekeepers. This Rapid Reaction Forces will be a backup force for the peacekeepers. For example, if the peacekeepers escorting a convoy delivering food or fuel to civilians come under attack, the peacekeepers can call on this Rapid Reaction Force, who would quickly come to their assistance.

It is important to be clear: The force will not fundamentally change the nature of UNPROFOR. It will continue to operate within its current mandate. It will have neither the means, nor the mission, to seek to use military force to impose a solution, or compel the parties to comply with all UN resolutions by force of arms. It will, however, give UNPROFOR significantly increased self-defense capability. That capability should make UNPROFOR more effective, as well as safer, because it will mean the commanders' efforts to secure Serb acquiescence in UNPROFOR carrying out its mission will be backed by more real military power.

The key contributors to this force would be the British and the French, who are contributing about 10,000 troops to the force. Several other nations have also indicated their interest in providing troops. The United States will not be providing ground troops to the Rapid Reaction Force.

We do, however, strongly support the objectives of this force, and we will provide support in four different areas: First of all, we will continue to provide close air support through NATO. Second, we offered to provide various systems, including attack helicopters; artillery-locating radar; communications gear; global positioning satellite navigation systems, and night-vision equipment. Third, we offered to provide lift, especially strategic airlift of forces and equipment to the theater of operations. And fourth, we have offered to provide UN commanders in Bosnia with what we call an intelligence communication cell.

This is a significant military technological advancement. The first time such an intelligence cell was used in warfare was in Desert Storm. It will be a communications network that will receive intelligence data on Bosnia collected by several nations and many sources, including tactical and national assets. It will

synthesize and display these data, and reduce them to intelligence products tailored to the tactical needs of the commanders of the Rapid Reaction Force. Finally, it will disseminate the intelligence products to the relevant commanders at headquarters and field units. This intelligence cell will provide the field commanders with the timely situation awareness that will greatly enhance their ability to carry out their protection mission. It is also envisioned that this cell will have access to data collected by low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles. These UAVs would be designed to fly under the clouds and take high resolution imagery of areas of interest.

This additional U.S. support for the UN peacekeeping mission can make a key difference. Our support through NATO has already made a difference.

### Limits of Policy Options

All that said, we are fully aware of the limitations of our present approach -- that by itself, it will not quickly end the war in Bosnia. People find this frustrating. This frustration has led to proposals to take active measures to help the Bosnian government achieve its political and military goals, including proposals for the United States to unilaterally lift the arms embargo.

Unilateral lift is not an alternative policy approach. It would be either a de facto pullout, or a de facto entry into the war. It would mean the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the end of humanitarian relief efforts, and Bosnian Serb attacks on the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo. It would be risky and would take time and money to arm Bosnian government forces. The end result would be U.S. responsibility for a greater mess in Bosnia. The U.S. would be left with the terrible choice of utter abandonment, or of getting into the war do to all the things UNPROFOR does now, however imperfectly, such as relief supplies -- plus assume other responsibilities that are not part of UNPROFOR's mission, such as active defense of the eastern enclaves. In short, if you follow these proposals to their natural conclusion, they lead down a slippery slope to the same unintended consequence: a humanitarian catastrophe, with the distinct possibility of a wider war breaking out and drawing in of American combat troops. And the unity of the NATO alliance would be shattered.

We cannot force a peaceful conclusion to the war in Bosnia. Only the parties can decide to end the war, and we will continue our diplomatic efforts to encourage a negotiated peace. The Bosnian Government has made the right choice in accepting the Contact Group plan; regrettably, the Bosnian Serbs have not. In the meantime, we will also support efforts to keep the war from spreading, reduce the violence, and mitigate the suffering.

We will persevere, but we will also put limits on our actions. Because when we put the lives of our men and women in uniform at risk, and commit our nation on a military course of action, the price we pay must be commensurate with the risk to our nation of not acting. Our course of action in Bosnia has reflected this important balance, and it will continue to do so.



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